In Narayan v. State of Madhya Pradesh,¹ a bench of the Supreme Court comprising Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar set aside an order of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh cancelling the bail of an accused person solely on account of his involvement in a subsequent offence under the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915("M.P. Excise Act"). The Court held that where the subsequent offence carries a punishment of less than five years, the stringent conditions prescribed under Section 480(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ("BNSS") are not attracted, and cancellation of bail on that ground alone is not legally justified.

The facts that lead to the present appeal are as follows. The appellant, Narayan, was initially granted bail on 20.11.2024 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in M.Cr.C. No. 49016/2024, in connection with Crime No. 388 of 2024. The bail was granted with regard to an offence punishable under Section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act, which prescribes a punishment of less than five years. Subsequent to the grant of bail, the appellant came to be implicated in another offence under the same statute. Seizing upon this development, the State of Madhya Pradesh filed an application for cancellation of bail under Section 483(2) of the BNSS. The High Court allowed the said application by its impugned order dated 11.03.2026 and cancelled the bail previously granted to the appellant. Aggrieved, Narayan approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether mere involvement of an accused in a subsequent offence carrying a punishment of less than five years, can constitute a valid ground for cancellation of bail, particularly in the context of the conditions prescribed under Section 480(3) of the BNSS. The appellant contended that the High Court had erred in cancelling his bail without appreciating the statutory threshold embedded in Section 480(3) of the BNSS, which limits the applicability of special bail conditions to offences punishable with seven years or more, or to offences falling under Chapter VI, Chapter VII, or Chapter XVII of the BNSS.

The Supreme Court, allowing the appeal by consent of both parties, undertook a focused examination of Section 480(3) of the BNSS. The said provision empowers a court to impose special conditions upon an accused who is released on bail, but only where the offence in question is punishable with imprisonment extending to seven years or more, or where the offence falls under Chapter VI (Offences Against the State), Chapter VII (Offences Relating to the Army, Navy and Air Force), or Chapter XVII (Offences Against Property) of the BNSS, or where the accused is charged with abetment of, or conspiracy or attempt to commit, any such offence.

Crucially, the Court observed that the subsequent offence with which the appellant stood implicated was one under Section 34(2) of the M.P. Excise Act, an offence whose maximum prescribed punishment falls below five years. Since the statutory conditions under Section 480(3) of the BNSS are only attracted where the punishment may extend to seven years or more, the Court categorically held that those conditions were not imposable in the present case. The High Court had therefore committed an error in allowing the State's application for cancellation.

Setting aside the impugned order of the High Court, the Supreme Court restored the bail granted to the appellant. However, the Court expressly directed that the appellant shall not engage in any activity of a criminal nature, and made it clear that the State retains the liberty to apply afresh for cancellation of bail should the appellant become involved in any offence falling within the scope of Section 480(3) of the BNSS, or on any other valid ground recognised by law.

The significance of this ruling lies in its reaffirmation of a foundational principle of bail jurisprudence: that bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled mechanically upon registration of a fresh case, particularly where the offence does not meet the statutory threshold prescribed under the BNSS. The decision serves as a corrective against a common prosecutorial practice of seeking bail cancellation on the ground of a subsequent case without demonstrating that the conditions stipulated under Section 480(3) of the BNSS are genuinely attracted. Courts must examine whether the supervening offence meets the requisite threshold before exercising the power of cancellation. The judgment is also noteworthy for its interpretive clarity on the interplay between the older framework of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the newly enacted BNSS, signalling that the transition to the new procedural code does not alter the substantive standards governing bail cancellation.

By - Akarsh Pandey and Ritika Yadav