The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd. 2026 INSC 132¹ that quasi-judicial authorities do not possess an inherent power of review and can exercise such power only where it is expressly conferred by statute or arises by necessary implication from the statutory framework.

Brief Facts
The matter arose from a land dispute in West Bengal, wherein the respondent company had purchased agricultural land before 1st January 1952. When the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, came into force, the respondent sought to retain the said land under Section 6(1)(j) of the Act, which permitted companies engaged exclusively in farming to retain land in their possession as on that date. The Revenue Officer passed an order dated 7th October 1971 denying this claim, holding that the respondent had failed to prove it was engaged exclusively in farming. The respondent challenged this order before the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court by way of a writ petition, however the same was dismissed in 1975. Subsequent attempts to restore the petition failed in 1987, and an appeal was also dismissed in 2002. Thus, the vesting order attained finality.

Around 2008, some 37 years later, the respondent approached the State Government with a proposal to establish an agro-based industrial project, and consequently the Government directed the Revenue Officer to review the 1971 order afresh. Acting on this direction, the Revenue Officer passed a fresh order dated 7th May 2008, setting aside the earlier determination and permitting the respondent to retain 211.21 acres. The West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal (“Tribunal”) quashed the said review order, holding that the Revenue Officer had no power to review. Thereafter, the High Court reversed the order of the Tribunal, prompting the State to file an appeal before the Apex Court.

Core Issue
The central question before the Court was whether the Revenue Officer had the power to review the 1971 vesting order. The respondent argued that Section 57A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act 1953 had invested Revenue Officers with ‘all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908’ and that this omnibus grant included the power of review as well. On the contrary, the State contended that the power of review must be specifically conferred and that the general language of Section 57A could not be so construed. The resolution of this issue turned on whether quasi-judicial authorities can exercise review jurisdiction absent express statutory provision.

Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and held the 2008 review order to be void ab initio for want of jurisdiction. The Court began by reiterating that the power of review is not inherent even for regular courts and must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. Relying on Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji² and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania,³ the Court observed that this principle applies with greater force to quasi-judicial authorities, which derive their limited powers entirely from statute. The Court held that an omnibus expression investing such authorities with ‘all powers of a Civil Court’ cannot, in absence of a specific enumeration, be construed to include the power of review.

The Court observed that the proviso to Section 57B(3) of the 1953 Act expressly bars the Revenue Officer from reopening any matter already determined by State authorities. The Court observed that this prohibition would be meaningless if the Revenue Officer possessed the power to review his own orders. The legislature's intention to deny review power was evident from the statute itself. The Court also grounded its decision in constitutional principle; tracing tribunal jurisprudence from S.P. Sampath Kumar⁵ to Madras Bar Association,⁶ it emphasised that tribunals must possess judicial independence in substance. To permit executive officers to review their own orders without the institutional safeguards attending judicial office would undermine separation of powers, which forms part of the basic structure. The power of review, being a core judicial function, cannot be vested in executive authorities through general grants of civil court powers.

Conclusion
This judgement reaffirms an important principle governing quasi-judicial power. The ratio decidendi is clear: quasi-judicial authorities have no inherent power of review and cannot review their own orders unless the statute expressly confers such power. This protects the finality of quasi-judicial determinations and prevents executive authorities from sitting in judgment over their own decisions without legislative authorisation. The decision preserves legislative supremacy by confirming that legislatures remain free to confer review powers if they see fit. The judgment also reinforces separation of powers by preventing the blurring of executive and judicial functions.

By - Gurdev Singh Tung and Utkarsh Tyagi